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The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of
resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent
management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confi-
dent about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek
majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest.
When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy
contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement
the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that
announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive
stock price reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily
extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional
investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such
promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such
bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even
policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have
ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between
tender offers and proxy contests.
1. Introduction
Unhappy with the corporate policies of incumbent management, dissi-
dent shareholders may initiate a proxy fight and oppose management’s
nominees to the company board. Alternatively, they may choose to
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make a tender offer for a controlling share of the firm’s common stock.
Despite the common perception that corporate control contests usually
take the form of hostile takeovers, studies have established that proxy
contests are used almost as frequently as hostile tender offers and serve
as an effective threat to incumbent management (DeAngelo and
DeAngelo, 1989).1 In this paper we analyze the choice between proxy
contests and tender offers as alternative means of resolving corporate
governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management.
While the existing literature has usually treated proxy contests and
takeovers separately, we will argue that the possibility of substitution
between the alternative mechanisms has important empirical and pol-
icy implications concerning corporate control issues.2
We analyze a situation in which a large dissident shareholder is
challenging incumbent management on aspects of its corporate policy.
The management is biased towards maintaining the status quo and is
opposed to such change.3 The dissident shareholder, having (privately)
uncovered information about the potential benefits from altering firm
policy, can attempt to force change by either tendering for a majority
of the outstanding shares or by soliciting votes from other shareholders
in a proxy contest. This choice is shown to be strongly influenced by
the nature of other shareholders in the firm. Though a majority of the
firm’s shareholders are assumed to be atomistic, large institutional
investors are present as well. These institutional investors can be piv-
otal in control contests; on occasion they may also be better informed
than the dissident about the potential benefits from changing firm
policy.
Our model indicates that tender offers will tend to be employed
when the dissident shareholder is relatively confident that the potential
improvement in value is high. On the other hand, if the potential value
1. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) provide evidence that between 1962 and 1983,
there were a total of 141 proxy contests for board seats at listed firms, compared with
171 cases of hostile tender offers. Further, DeAngelo and DeAngelo dispel the notion
that the proxy contest is an ineffective means of affecting change in control. In one-third
of the cases they study, dissidents won control of the target board. In another one-third,
they won minority representation. Dissidents played a major role in the sale/liquidation
of assets and management turnover: often, they themselves bought the firms or replaced
the incumbents as managers.
2. The substitution between alternative mechanisms and the information aggregation
problem also underlie the analysis of boards of directors and takeovers as two monitors
of management in Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994, 1996).
3. ‘‘Change’’ may involve divesting some existing projects. Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
argue that managers may resist divestment if their human capital is sunk in existing
projects or processes. Boot (1992) points out that managers may avoid divestiture out of
reputational concerns.
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improvement is small or the large shareholder is relatively uninformed
about the potential value improvement, then proxy contests will be
employed. This feature of the model is reminiscent of the idea put
forward by Pound (1988, 1991) that ‘‘Bidders who cannot increase value
will try to gain control through proxy contests, while bidders who can
add value will signal their seriousness through tender offers’’ (Pound,
1988).4 The model thus predicts that stock price reactions to tender
offer announcements will tend to be more favorable than those for
proxy contests. This is consistent with the empirical evidence [see
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) and Jarrell et al. (1988)].
We investigate the effect of various parameters on the choice be-
tween proxy contests and tender offers and their effect on firm value,
as well as the magnitude of the price reactions following announce-
ments of tender offers or proxy challenges. These results generate em-
pirically testable implications.
Our analysis also indicates that the consequences of policy
changes that affect the costs of conducting tender offers or proxy con-
tests, or the voting behavior of institutional investors, need to be exam-
ined with caution. We stress two key points. One is that, since proxy
contests and tender offers are alternative mechanisms for effecting
change in corporate policy, changes in parameter values will often
mean favoring one of these at the expense of the other. The implications
for firm value will depend on whether, on the margin, tender offers or
proxy contests are more desirable. Several counterintuitive possibilities
are shown. For example, if the proxy process is not highly efficient (in
the sense that the quality of information with passive investors is not
high), then lowering the cost of conducting proxy challenges may not
be desirable from a policy perspective, since inefficient proxy contests
may crowd out more efficient tender offers.5
The second key point is that policy changes may have the effect
of changing the voting behavior of institutional investors: from implicit
reliance on the quality of the dissident’s information in a proxy contest,
4. Our approach has some similarities to the model of Harris and Raviv (1988). In
their paper as well, the proxy process is viewed as one in which the information of
passive shareholders can be utilized to attain a better outcome for the firm in a control
contest. The focus of Harris and Raviv (1988) is, however, on the role of capital structure
in affecting the votes controlled by management.
5. Thus, whether or not increases in the cost of conducting proxy contests during a
particular historical period (see Pound, 1991) and the associated decline in the use of
proxy contests is undesirable depends on the quality of the information with the passive
investors.
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to voting on the basis of their own information. Policy proposals such
as those under the ERISA guidelines—requiring institutional investors
to justify their voting practices—may well have such an effect. We
argue that the consequences of such policy changes for firm value can
be ambiguous, depending on the quality of the institutional investors’
information. Also, to the extent higher ownership stakes increase the
incentive to collect information, greater institutional ownership can re-
sult in a lower success rate and possibly less frequent use of proxy
contests, but higher firm value. This is in contrast to Pound (1988), who
finds proxy contests are less likely to be used (and less successfully)
for firms with greater institutional ownership, but concludes this to
be evidence in favor of ‘‘management bias’’ in the voting behavior of
institutional investors, and thus symptomatic of inefficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is devel-
oped in Sections 2 and 3. Empirical implications of the model and the
comparative statics are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. The issue of pro-
management bias in proxy voting and policy implications are in Sec-
tions 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
We follow Shleifer and Vishny (1986) in assuming that a fraction a of
the shares of an all equity firm are held by a large shareholder, hence-
forth denoted L.6 Management owns a fraction g of the firm’s equity,
while the remaining shares are held by passive shareholders. The latter
consist of dispersed atomistic shareholders and institutional investors.
A majority, v . 12, of the outstanding shares are assumed to be owned




Let q denote the value of the firm under current policy. L invests
some resources in monitoring the firm. This monitoring activity will
6. Aspects of our model are closely related to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), which
analyzes the role of large shareholders in tender offers.
7. This assumption is made to ensure that the institutional shareholders are not piv-
otal in share-tendering outcomes. However, if the institutional shareholders are informed,
it is possible that their presence could affect the share-tendering outcome in other ways.
The information structure chosen for the model allows us to avoid such complications
(see Section 2.3).
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result, with probability r, in L identifying an alternative policy to the
one being followed by incumbent management.8 Ex ante, the alternative
policy will be assumed to enhance firm value by z, which is a random
draw from a distribution F(z). F(z) is taken to be continuously differenti-
able with density ƒ(z) and support [z, z ], where 1` # z , 0 and ``
$ z . 0. To simplify notation, we shall assume that F(z) is symmetric
around zero, so that E(z) 4 0, where E(⋅) denotes expected value. None
of the results depend on this assumption. We also assume that F(z)
satisfies the increasing-hazard-rate property:
A1:
ƒ(z)
1 1 F(z) is increasing in z.
As is well known, many standard distributions such as the normal
or uniform satisfy this property. A1 is not crucial for our analysis;
however, it simplifies the exposition.
As we shall discuss, the manner in which the large shareholder
attempts to alter corporate policy can depend on the quality of his
information about the benefits from adopting the alternative policy.
We allow for heterogeneity in the quality of the information with the
large shareholder by assuming that the information can be of two types.
With probability m, L has very precise information about the potential
value improvement from the alternative policy that his monitoring has
generated, i.e., he knows the true realized value of z. We say that in
this case, L is (perfectly) informed. With probability 1 1 m, however, L
is relatively uninformed and knows only that z is a random draw from
F(z).
Since our interest is in issues of corporate control, we will assume
that the incumbent management has a vested interest in preserving the
status quo and would resist change, even if it knew the alternative
policy to be better. Possible reasons for this may be that management
has its human capital or its reputation tied to current investment poli-
cies [see Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Boot (1992)]. Further, the alter-
native policy might entail changing the management team or liquidat-
ing the firm, resulting in management losing its benefits from control.
8. The assumption that it is L, rather than an institutional investor, that initially
investigates the firm and decides on the appropriate course of action is based on our
desire to analyze the interaction between proxy contests and takeovers in equilibrium.
Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies are not in a posi-
tion (on account of legal/charter restrictions and lack of managerial and operational
expertise) to make tender offers and directly manage companies. In addition, even proxy
contests are almost never initiated by institutional investors. One rare case is the 1990
proxy contest for XTRA that was initiated (and won) by Gintel Funds (a mutual fund).
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The implementation of the alternative policy may, therefore, require a
new management without commitment to existing policies or, as the
case might be, with an established reputation for successful liquida-
tions.9 It may be unnecessary to dismiss incumbent management if a
change in board composition, say from management-dominated to one
vigilant about shareholder concerns, is sufficient to ensure the imple-
mentation of the alternative policy.10 For our discussion the assumption
is that a change in corporate control is necessary to alter corporate
policy, though management may or may not be dismissed subse-
quently.
Once an alternative policy is found, L has three options: (a) do
nothing, (b) make a tender offer for at least half the outstanding shares,
or (c) initiate a proxy challenge. Apart from the information he obtains,
L’s choice will be influenced by the cost of making a tender offer (cT )
compared to that of organizing a proxy contest (cP ). We will assume
throughout that
A2: cP . cT .11
Not all our results require this assumption. In the subsequent
analysis, we shall indicate which of our results depend on it.
2.2 Passive Shareholder Information and Voting
Behavior
As mentioned above, passive shareholders are of two types: dispersed
atomistic shareholders and institutional investors. The former are unin-
formed, while the latter are assumed to possess some information. We
will assume that the ownership stake of institutional investors, as well
as the quality of their information (prior to the control contest), is low
enough to preclude them from initiating proxy contests, consistent with
observed behavior.12 Another way to justify the passivity of institu-
tional investors in the model is to argue that a significant amount of
9. Such a reputation may help overcome potential ex post problems if precommitment
to a particular policy is not possible.
10. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1996) analyze a model in which the external market (take-
overs) serves to discipline management as well as the board.
11. A detailed discussion of how SEC regulations have significantly contributed to
the costs of proxy contests is to be found in Pound (1991). These costs comprise legal
costs (which for control contests can be as high as 1.5 to 3.5 million dollars), the cost of
obtaining the shareholder list and establishing direct contact with the shareholders, and
advertisement costs. It has been argued that the high costs associated with a proxy
challenge have been an important reason for their apparent lack of popularity in the
post–1960 period (see Pound, 1992, p. 14).
12. In this regard, see footnote 8.
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their information is acquired only after the dissident shareholder
launches a tender offer or a proxy contest. The notion is that institu-
tional investors, with a large portfolio of investments, find it too costly
to monitor each individual firm.13 Once they are alerted by the action
of a dissident shareholder, however, they utilize their staff of research
analysts and draw upon their information sources to analyze the merits
of the alternative policy being proposed. Among their sources of infor-
mation is the incumbent management, which can be approached, and
is usually more than willing, to disclose information in an effort to gain
the support of institutional investors, particularly in proxy contests.14
Despite the information uncovered by the dissident shareholder,
it seems reasonable that his information may not always dominate that
of institutional investors in aggregate.15 The institutional investors may
also, on occasion, have better information about market conditions,
potential competitors, pending legislation, and regulatory issues such
as antitrust than the dissident shareholder. Dismal performance under
current management may also prompt a relatively uninformed dissi-
dent (who possibly has high opportunity cost of monitoring or lacks
firm- or industry-specific expertise) to propose a ‘‘reasonable alterna-
tive policy’’—thereby attracting scrutiny by institutional investors and,
possibly, their support if they find the alternative more attractive than
current policy.16
Based on the discussion above, our assumption is that the infor-
mation available to institutional investors is noisier than that available
to an informed L. It is, however, less noisy than that available to an
13. For instance, according to a story on the role of large institutions in monitoring
companies (Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1993), ‘‘The $75 bn. CALPERS targets only 12
companies at a time and may cut back to 10 because of limited staff time.’’
14. Institutional investors are often actively lobbied by management and dissidents.
Our view is that institutional investors interpret the information from these and other
sources in arriving at their voting decisions. An example is the active lobbying of institu-
tional investors in the 1996 Chrysler proxy initiated by Kerkorian. In the 1990 Lockheed
proxy the dissident shareholder (Mr. Simmons) and the Lockheed chairman took their
cases ‘‘to scores of institutions in more than a dozen cities, trying to convince them why
a particular team is best suited to lead the aerospace giant’’ (Wall Street Journal, March
27, 1990). Management and dissidents also use the media and proxy statements to publi-
cize and build support for their positions.
15. For example, if all institutional investors have negative information about the
proposed change, their aggregate information may be of high enough quality that a less
than perfectly informed dissident would defer to their decision. A proxy contest may
enable such information to be reflected in the outcome. Also, see footnote 17.
16. Sridharan and Reinganum (1995) find that firms with poor financial performance
are more likely to be subject to proxy contests than to tender offers—a finding that is
consistent in our model with the view that dissidents may use the proxy process to invite
the scrutiny of institutional investors and rely on their information to implement a better
policy.
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uninformed L. Hence, depending on the type of information obtained
by L, the quality of his information may be more or less reliable than
that of the institutional investors.17 It follows, therefore, that the voting
behavior of institutional investors will be affected not only by their own
information but also by their beliefs about the quality of the dissident’s
information. Formally we will assume that the institutional investors
privately observe a signal t that can take values t` and t1 such that
Pr[ t` | z . 0] 4 Pr[ t1 | z , 0] 4 p $ 12. (1)
The institutional investors’ strategy in a tender offer or a proxy chal-
lenge may depend on the signal that they receive (i.e., whether t` or
t1 ) and its quality p. Note that if p 4 1, their signal tells them for
sure in which interval z lies, while if p 4 12, the signal is completely
uninformative.18
To simplify the analysis, we take there to be only one institutional
investor. By assumption, this investor is not pivotal in the tender offer
if the fraction of the shares asked for is less than v, since the dispersed
shareholders own more than 50 percent of the shares. However, we
assume that in the proxy contest the institutional investor’s vote com-
pletely determines the outcome. For this, two assumptions are neces-
sary: (a) the atomistic shareholders either do not vote or (since they
are uninformed) vote randomly to largely cancel each other out,19 and
(b) the institutional investor owns more than |a 1 g | shares.
The assumption of only one institutional investor is obviously a
far cry from reality, and some discussion of its significance for the
analysis is called for. In fact, this assumption is not crucial for most of
our conclusions. For instance, consider a scenario with several institu-
tional investors, each of them observing a private informative signal
17. The reason we need the quality of information with L not to dominate that of
the institutional investors is that otherwise, there would not be any rational basis for the
latter to ever oppose L, absent any benefits of control to the dissident in the model. A
model in which there may be random benefits of control for the dissident but where the
dissident is always better informed than the institutions will preserve many (but not all) of
the features of the analysis. We do not deny that such benefits of control may occasionally
motivate proxy contests; however, since many of the successful proxy contests result in
divestitures and/or liquidations, we find it more natural to assume that the benefits of
control reside exclusively with current management.
18. The probability Pr[ t` | z ] as a function of z in equation (1) is a step function,
which jumps from a value 1 1 p that is less than 12 to a value p greater than
1
2 as z goes
from less than zero to greater than zero (assuming there is no atom at z 4 0, the specifica-
tion at z 4 0 does not matter). More generally, one would have a smooth increasing
function with a value of 12 at zero, values less than
1
2 for z , 0, and values greater than
1
2 for z . 0.
19. This is consistent with rational voting behavior, since atomistic shareholders do
not expect to be pivotal and to affect the outcome of the proxy contest.
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of the type described above (of quality p ′ . 12). If a voting equilibrium
exists in which they vote on the basis of their information (which could
be different for any two such investors), then our analysis will go
through completely if we reinterpret the probability p in (1) as the
probability that the proxy outcome is ‘‘yes’’ given that z . 0 or ‘‘no’’
given z , 0.20
We now state a result regarding the voting behavior of the (single)
institutional investor (henceforth denoted N ). We say that N votes with
L if he supports L irrespective of his own private signal. We say N
votes on the basis of his own information if he opposes L if and only if he
observes t1. Also, let ZP denote the set of z for which an informed L
will go for a proxy contest.
Proposition 1:
(a) If, in equilibrium, L participates in the proxy only when he is informed,
then N votes with L in a proxy. (b) If both the informed and the uninformed




2(1 1 m )(2p 1 1)E[z | z . 0]
` m(1 1 p ) Pr[z [ ZP ] E[z | z [ ZP ] , 0, (2)
and he votes with L otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward. If, in
equilibrium, only informed types of L initiate proxy contests, the
institutional investor will vote with L, given L’s superior information.
When both informed and uninformed L types initiate proxy contests,
however, N’s voting strategy will depend on the proportion of unin-
formed L types initiating proxies in equilibrium and the relative
quality of his own information. Note that for m 4 1 and/or p 4
1
2, the l.h.s. of (2) is positive, while for m 4 0 and/or p 4 1, it is
negative. A high enough ex ante probability of an informed L or
very poor quality of his own information will cause the institutional
20. The conditions under which such an equilibrium may exist or fail to exist were
discussed in an earlier version of the paper available from the authors. These conditions
are analogous to those given in Proposition 1. If only an informed L participates in a
proxy, then it is a dominant strategy for any institutional shareholder to vote with L,
irrespective of his own information. On the other hand, if uninformed L’s also participate,
and there is a high enough proportion of such L’s, then given that every other investor
is voting on the basis of his information, it is optimal for a given institutional investor
to do so, i.e., there is an equilibrium in which each institutional investor votes on the
basis of his information.
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investor to vote with L; on the other hand, if his own information
is of high quality or the probability of an informed L is small, he
will tend to rely on his own information.
2.3 The Share-Tendering Decision
Proposition 1 was concerned with the behavior of the institutional
investor in a proxy contest; the following proposition characterizes the
share-tendering decision of both the institutional and atomistic share-
holders in a tender offer.
Proposition 2: Suppose that, in equilibrium, only informed L’s make
a tender offer. Also suppose that the equilibrium is such that there exists a z
. 0, say zm , such that all informed L’s who draw z $ zm make a tender offer
for a fraction 12 1 a of the shares. Then any successful tender offer bid b(a)
must satisfy
b(a) $ q ` E[z | z $ zm ]. (3)
Proof. Note that for the institutional investor N, the fact that a tender
offer has been made by L conveys more information (i.e., z belongs to
[zm , z ] for sure) than his own informative signal—and so the latter
will not affect his share tendering decision. Hence, for any passive
shareholder, given that others are tendering and the tender offer will
be successful, it is optimal not to tender if condition (3) does not hold.
This means that for the tender offer to succeed, (3) must hold. M
We shall assume that when the shareholders are indifferent be-
tween tendering and not tendering, they will tender.21 In view of this,
the following is immediate:
Corollary 1: If the equilibrium has the features described in Proposition
2, then any bid that satisfies condition (3) succeeds with probability one.
3. The Choice between Proxies and Tender
Offers
In this section, we consider L’s choice between the two alternative meth-
ods of corporate control. To begin with, we state a lemma that is helpful
21. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) allow shareholders to follow a randomization strat-
egy and derive the equilibrium probability with which bids must be rejected for the bids
to be fully revealing. This approach has the merit of being consistent with the observed
phenomenon of bids being rejected with some probability. While it is possible to extend
our analysis in this direction, we do not pursue it here. See also Chowdhry and Jegadeesh
(1994).
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FIGURE 1. COMPARATIVE STATICS ON zAm.
for the statement of our results and some of the comparative statics.
The straightforward proof is omitted.22
Lemma 1: Given assumption A1, for k # 1, kE[z̃ | z̃ $ z ] 1 z is monotoni-
cally decreasing in z.
In what follows, we characterize two equilibria, one in which the
institutional investor defers to the information of the dissident and
always votes with L, and the other in which he votes on the basis of
his own information. We label these, respectively, type A and type B
equilibria.
3.1 Characterization of Type A Equilibria
Let us define zAm as the unique z (if it exists) which satisfies










Notice that by virtue of A2, it is immediate that zAl . 0 and zAm , z̄ (see
Fig. 1). We make the following assumption:
22. A proof is provided in the earlier version of the paper; see Dasgupta and Nanda
(1995).
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A3: (0 ,) zAl , zAm (, z̄ ).
To see that there are parameter values for which A3 will be satis-
fied, it is enough to note that (1) cP 1 cT . 0 implies zAm , z̄, (2) zAl is
positively related to cP and tends to zero as cP tends to zero, and (3)
zAm is negatively related to cp 1 cT and tends to z̄ as cT and cP both tend
to zero. (See Fig. 1.) As an example, suppose z is uniform over [11,
1], cP 4 0.05, cT 4 0, and a 4 0.1. Then we have zAl 4 0.5 and zAm 4
0.75.
The significance of zAl and zAm is as follows. If the equilibrium is
such that N votes with L, then L wins the proxy contest with probability
1. Hence, the expected payoff to an informed L from a proxy contest
is az 1 cP . Here zAl is the lowest value of z for which this is nonnegative,
i.e., the lowest z for which an informed L will participate in the proxy,
given that N will vote with L.
To understand zAm , note that if z is such that L will go for a tender
offer if and only if L is informed and draws z̃ $ z, then the lowest price
at which the tender offer will be successful is b 4 q ` E[ z̃ | z̃ $ z ].
The gain to L from a tender offer is then
0.5(q ` z) 1 (0.5 1 a)b 1 aq 1 cT
4 0.5z 1 (0.5 1 a)E[z̃ | z̃ $ z] 1 cT .
The gain to L for the same z from a proxy contest that he will win for
sure is az 1 cP .
It is easily checked that for z 4 zAm , the gains from a tender offer
and a proxy challenge are the same, i.e., zAm is the value of z for which
L is indifferent between a tender offer and a proxy challenge if, in
equilibrium, L goes for a tender offer if and only if z $ zAm .
We are now ready to characterize one equilibrium of interest.
Proposition 3: Under assumptions A1–A3, there exists a (semipool-
ing) equilibrium in which:
(i) Informed L types bid for a fraction 0.5 1 a of the shares at a price b*(a)
4 q ` E[z̃ | z̃ $ zAm ] if z . zAm , and go for a proxy challenge if z̃ [
[zAl , zAm ).
(ii) Uninformed L types, and informed L types with z , zAl , stay out.
(iii) Shareholders tender their shares if a tender offer is made, and N votes
with L if a proxy challenge is initiated by L.
Further, this is the only semipooling equilibrium in which N votes with L
that is consistent with the Grossman-Perry refinement.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
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The equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is a semipooling equi-
librium in the sense that for all z [ [zAl , zAm ), L initiates a proxy chal-
lenge, while for all z . zAm , L makes a tender offer. The reason why the
high-z types go for a tender offer whereas the lower-z types prefer a
proxy contest is as follows. Since both tender offers and proxy contests
succeed with probability 1, the choice of the takeover mechanism re-
flects the respective costs. For a proxy contest, the cost is cP ; however,
for a tender offer, the costs involve cT plus the adverse-selection costs.
The latter arise because—as in Shleifer and Vishny (1986)—the bid
price reflects pooling across all the types that bid [see equation (3)], so
that the low types in the pool always pay a premium over the true
value. Since cT , cP and for the highest type z the adverse-selection
cost is absent, the highest type will always go for a tender offer. By
continuity, there will an interval of the highest types that do so, until
the adverse-selection costs become too high.
The voting behavior of the institutional shareholders in the equi-
librium described in Proposition 3 is an example of an ‘‘informational
cascade’’ in the sense of Bikhchandani et al. (1992).23 We shall call such
an equilibrium a semipooling equilibrium of type A. Under our assump-
tions, it is nondegenerate in that both tender offers and proxy contests
occur with nonzero probability. If A2 is violated, tender offers will not
be observed and we shall have a pure pooling equilibrium in which L
chooses a proxy contest for z $ zAl .24 It is easy to see that a pure pooling
equilibrium in which only tender offers are observed is possible if cP
is sufficiently high.
As noted, one feature of this equilibrium is that a proxy challenge
succeeds with probability 1. Since the observed success rate in proxy
challenges is far from being 100 percent, this may not seem very appeal-
ing. One possible reconciliation is to assume that institutions exhibit
some bias towards management in voting behavior, and that proxy
challenges are defeated with probability 1 1 b, irrespective of the insti-
tutional investor’s information. However, this is not the only way to
reconcile theory and practice. As we discuss next, there is another equi-
librium (type B) in which the institutional investor votes according to
his information and proxy challenges do get defeated some of the time
(even without management bias). We shall argue later that the observa-
tional equivalence of a type A equilibrium with bias and a type B equi-
23. An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual who ob-
serves the actions of those ahead of him to follow the latter’s behavior without regard
to his own information.
24. However, if we introduce promanagement bias in proxy voting, tender offers
would be observed even for some cP , cT . See Sections 6 and 7.
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librium (with or without bias) can lead to unwarranted conclusions
from the observed failure rate of proxy challenges.
3.2 Characterization of Type B Equilibria
For N to vote on the basis of his own information, condition (2) has
to be satisfied. Moreover, it must be optimal for an uninformed L to
participate in the proxy contest. This requires the expected gain for an
uninformed L from a proxy challenge, given that N is voting on the
basis of his own information, to be positive, i.e.,
a$Pr[z . 0] Pr[ t` | z . 0] E[z | z . 0]
` Pr[z , 0] Pr[ t` | z , 0] E[z | z , 0]} 1 cP $ 0.
By virtue of (1) and the assumption that E[z | z . 0] 4 1E[z | z , 0],
this reduces to
1
2a(2p 1 1)E[z | z . 0] 1 cP $ 0. (6)
It is evident that the condition holds for cP (and cT —in view of A2)
small enough, and for p . 12.
Let k 4 (0.5 1 a)/(0.5 1 ap ). Notice that k , 1. Appealing to
Lemma 1, let us define zBm to be the unique z (if it exists at all) such
that
kE[z̃ | z̃ $ zBm ] 1 zBm 4
cP 1 cT
0.5 1 ap . (7)





As before, it is immediate from A2 that zBl . 0 and zBm , z (see Fig. 2).
We shall make the following assumption:
A4: (0 ,) zBl , zBm (, z ).
Again, it is easily seen that there are parameter values for which
the assumption is satisfied, since zBl tends to zero as cP tends to zero,
and zBm tends to an upper bound as cP and cT both tend to zero. As an
example, suppose z is uniform over [11, 1], cP 4 0.05, cT 4 0, a 4
0.1, and p 4 0.9. Then we have zBl 4 0.555 and zBm 4 0.71.
The significance of zBm and zBl is similar to that of zAm and zAl , respec-
tively. If the equilibrium is such that N votes on the basis of his own
information, then an informed L wins the proxy with probability
p. Hence, the expected payoff to an informed L from a proxy is
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FIGURE 2. COMPARATIVE STATICS ON zBm.
apz 1 cP . Here zBl is the lowest value of z for which this is nonnegative,
i.e., the lowest z for which an informed L will initiate the proxy, given
that N will vote on the basis of his own information.
To understand zBm , note that if there is a z such that L will go for
a tender offer if and only if he is informed and draws z̃ $ z, then the
lowest price at which the tender offer will be successful is b 4 q `
E[z̃ | z̃ $ z ]. The gain to L (given that z is obtained) from a tender offer
is, as before, equal to 0.5z 1 (0.5 1 a)E[z̃ | z̃ $ z ] 1 cT . The gain to L
for the same z from a proxy which he will win with probability p is
apz 1 cP . (See Fig. 2.) It is easily checked that for z 4 zBm , the gain
from a tender offer and a proxy challenge are the same, i.e., zBm is the
value of z at which L is indifferent between a tender offer and a proxy
challenge if, in equilibrium, L makes a tender offer when z̃ $ zBm . We
are now ready to characterize a second type of equilibrium:
Proposition 4: Under assumptions A1, A2, and A4, if conditions (2)
and (6) hold, there exists a semipooling equilibrium in which:
(i) Informed L types bid for a fraction 0.5 1 a of the shares at a price b*(a)
4 q ` E[z̃ | z̃ $ zBm ] if z . zBm , and go for a proxy challenge if z [
[zBl , zBm ).
(ii) Informed L types with z , zBl stay out.
(iii) Uninformed L types go for a proxy challenge.
(iv) Shareholders tender their shares if a tender offer is made, and N votes
on the basis of his own information in a proxy contest.
Further, this is the only semipooling equilibrium in which N votes on the basis
of his own information that is consistent with the Grossman-Perry refinement.
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Proof. The proof follows that of Proposition 3 very closely and is
omitted. M
An interesting aspect of type B equilibria is that while it is
unprofitable for an informed L with low but positive z to initiate a
proxy (i.e., all z [ [0, zBl )), it is still profitable for an uninformed L
with E[z] 4 0 to do so. The explanation for this is that the uninformed
L, given that he utilizes the filter of the institutional investors, can
benefit from the potentially large upside (if z . 0) but be protected
from the downside (if z , 0) if the latter are well informed. This
makes it profitable for an uninformed L to initiate a proxy, though
not for an informed L with low positive z. This is also obviously a
source of value for the firm: given that the institutional investor is
informed (p . 0.5), a proxy does more good than harm when the
potential for value improvement exists ex ante. Hence, when the propor-
tion of uninformed Ls is sufficiently high, one would expect type B
equilibrium to be more desirable for firm value. This issue will be
taken up in detail in Section 7.
It has been argued [most notably by Pound (1988, 1992)] that
tender offers will be initiated by a dissident only when he is relatively
confident in his ex post ability to increase share value. Proxy challenges,
on the other hand, may be initiated by an insurgent shareholder who
is ‘‘seeking personal satisfaction, or may be no more than a wealthy
crank.’’ The type B equilibrium is reminiscent of this type of characteri-
zation. Tender offers are initiated only by informed L’s with high poten-
tial for value improvement. Proxy challenges, on the other hand, may
be initiated by informed L’s with low potential for value improvement,
or relatively uninformed dissidents. The latter—given that they have
their own stakes in the firm—will rely on the efficiency of the proxy
process itself (i.e., the information of the institutional shareholders) to
compensate them for the costs of conducting a proxy challenge. In
Section 4, we shall consider some additional implications of this type
of characterization.25
Two other important features of type B equilibria are that, for p
, 1, (1) proxies are defeated with positive probability, even in the
absence of bias, and (2) the ex post performance of the firm after a
successful proxy challenge (by an uninformed L) could be worse than
25. Notice that for type B equilibrium, assumption A2 is stronger than what we need
to ensure proxy contests do not dominate tender offers. Since k , 1, there is a range of
cP such that even for cP , cT , tender offers would be observed.
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under current management. This last feature is consistent with evidence
in Mulherin and Poulsen (1995).26
4. Announcement Effects
Stock price reactions following announcements of tender offers are, on
average, more favorable than those following announcements of proxy
initiatives. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) study 60 proxy contests for
board seats of exchange-listed firms during 1978–1985. They find that
the average 2-day abnormal stock return around the first report of
dissident activity is 4.85 percent, while the average 40-day cumulative
abnormal return is 18.76 percent. In comparison with these findings,
stock price increases following announcements of tender offers are typi-
cally larger. Jarrell et al. (1988), citing a study by the Office of the Chief
Economist of the SEC, report that, for a sample of 225 successful tender
offers during 1981–1984, the average premium to shareholders was
53.2 percent.27 Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) report that in their sample of
663 successful tender offers between 1962 and 1985, the figures were
19 percent in the 1960s, 35 percent in the 1970s, and 30 percent for
1980–1985.
Our model is consistent with these findings. Given that in either
type of equilibrium the dissident shareholder chooses to make a tender
offer when the z is high, it is intuitive that tender-offer announcements
will be associated with a more positive price reaction than proxy an-
nouncements. This is confirmed in the following:
Proposition 5: In both types of equilibria, the price reaction following
the announcement of a tender offer is greater than that of a proxy challenge.
The former is always positive, and the latter is positive for r sufficiently small.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
It should also be noted that instances in which dissidents lose
proxy contests tend to be associated with a decrease in firm stock price.
It has been suggested that this is reflective of inefficiencies in the proxy
process such as promanagement bias on the part of the institutional
investors. However, it is clear that such price reactions are perfectly
26. They report that a substantial fraction of firms with proxy contests experience
wealth losses in the year following the successful resolution of the contest (e.g., when
the dissident wins board seats). The ex post performance is, however, significantly better
when the proxy contest results in senior management being replaced.
27. The premium is calculated by comparing the price paid by the bidder with the
price at which the stock was trading one month before the offer.
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consistent with our model in which promanagement bias is absent.
Proxy challenges are defeated only in a type B equilibrium and reflect
unfavorable information on the part of the institutional shareholder.
This implies that proxy defeats should lead to a drop in expected firm
value, since, prior to resolution of the proxy contest, there is some
probability with which the proxy is expected to succeed and lead to a
beneficial change in firm policy.
We now state some comparative static results:
Proposition 6: In a type A equilibrium:
1(i) The probability of a tender offer is increasing in cP , decreasing in cT ,
and increasing in a.
1(ii) The magnitude of the price reaction following a tender-offer announce-
ment is decreasing in cP for r sufficiently small, increasing in cT , and
decreasing in a.
2(i) The probability of a proxy challenge is decreasing in cP , increasing in
cT , but ambiguous w.r.t. change in a.
2(ii) The price reaction following the announcement of a proxy challenge is
ambiguous w.r.t. a change in cP , increasing in cT , and decreasing in a.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
For type B equilibria, the results for cP , cT , and a are completely
analogous to Proposition 6 for type A equilibria. An increase in p can
be shown to reduce the probability of a tender offer and increase the
magnitude of the price reaction following a tender-offer announcement.
It increases the probability of a proxy contest, and has an ambiguous
effect on the magnitude of the stock price reaction following a proxy
announcement.
Existing empirical evidence, where available, is consistent with
these predictions. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) find that takeover premia
in tender offers increased after the Williams Act of 1968, which is re-
garded as having increased takeover costs. Sridharan and Reinganum
(1995) find evidence that the probability of proxy contests increases as
the firm becomes more insider-dominated. This is consistent with the
view that in these situations, institutions are more vigilant and better
informed (higher p), leading to higher probability of proxy contests.
5. Effect of Parameter Changes on Firm Value
In this section, our objective is to evaluate the effect of changes in model
parameters, say on account of policy changes, on firm value. From this
standpoint, type B equilibria are more interesting, since policy changes
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involve substitutions on the margin between tender offers and proxy
contests, and the quality of information with the institutional investors
thus becomes very important. This is not an issue in type A equilibria,
since the institutional investors do not vote on the basis of their own
information.
Proposition 7: In a type A equilibrium, firm value is increasing in a,
decreasing in cP , and unaffected by cT .
Proof. See the Appendix. M
Proposition 8: In a type B equilibrium:
1. An increase in the costs of a proxy lowers the success rate of the proxy,
but has an ambiguous effect on firm value. For p sufficiently close to 1,
firm value decreases as cP increases.
2. An increase in tender-offer costs cT , ceteris paribus, increases the success
rate of the proxy, but lowers firm value.
3. An increase in a increases firm value, but has an ambiguous effect on the
success rate of the proxy.
4. For p sufficiently close to 1, an increase in p increases firm value. An
increase in p always increases the success rate of proxies.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part 1 of Proposition 8 indicates the interesting possibility that if
the proxy process is not very efficient (i.e., p is low), lowering the costs
of conducting a proxy contest may be an inappropriate policy response.
Increasing the cost of a proxy contest may be beneficial because this
would encourage more tender offers at the expense of proxy challenges,
while the fact that fewer informed L’s initiate proxy challenges will not
be costly if p is low. Part 2 differs from Proposition 7 in that in a
type B equilibrium, greater reliance on proxy contests at the expense
of tender offers means that institutional investors determine the proxy
outcome, and so a (perfectly) informed L will be defeated some of the
time (this does not happen with tender offers). The same reasoning
underlies part 4—higher p on the margin causes proxy contests to
displace tender offers. Unless p is high, it is possible that an increase
in p can lower firm value.
6. Promanagement Bias and Voting Behavior
An important issue in the literature on proxy voting has been that of
promanagement bias in the proxy-voting behavior of institutional inves-
tors. Several authors have argued that institutional investors, either to
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protect their business relationship with companies or for other reasons,
routinely vote in favor of management. The Department of Labor’s
recent reiterations of ERISA’s fiduciary rules essentially require
whoever has voting authority (either the plan fiduciary or the invest-
ment manager) to use a formal written policy to avoid conflict of inter-
est. Thus, implicitly at least, the potential for promanagement bias
seems to have been taken for granted.28
To address some policy issues, it is useful to incorporate the possi-
bility of such bias into our analysis. We do this by assuming that with
a probability 1 1 b, the institutional investor is perceived to vote in
favor of management, irrespective of information.29 In a type A equilib-
rium this implies that the proxy challenge succeeds with probability
b.
Proposition 9: In type A equilibrium, the success rate and frequency
of proxy contests are decreasing in the degree of management bias, 1 1 b.
For b sufficiently close to 1, firm value is also decreasing in the degree of
management bias.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
The part of Proposition 9 that may be somewhat nonintuitive is
that it requires b to be sufficiently larger for the firm value to be decreas-
ing in the degree of management bias. In fact, it can be easily checked
that firm value may not be increasing in b.30 The intuition here is that
greater management bias reduces the benefits from proxies and causes
tender offers to replace proxy contests on the margin. This increases
firm value when the loss from the lower efficiency of proxy contests due
to the lower b is small, i.e., when proxies are not used very frequently.
For type B equilibrium, analogous results are obtained. We do
28. Brickley et al. (1988) find that, for antitakeover proposals, while institutional
shareholders as a group appear ‘‘vigilant’’ (vote more actively than nonblockholders and
oppose management when the proposals seem to harm shareholders), pressure-sensitive
institutional investors such as banks and insurance companies tend to favor management.
In the only study to date on voter-level data, Van Nuys (1993) finds that for the Honeywell
proxy solicitation case in 1989, more than half of the 72 largest institutional investors,
holding 41.5 percent of the shares, voted in favor of the dissidents. Significantly, however,
while banks and insurance companies tended to support management, their voting be-
havior did not appear to depend on whether or not they had business ties to the firm.
29. For example, the management might control a block of votes of random size. If
the size of this block exceeds the total number of shares with the dissident and those
institutional investors not biased towards management, the outcome of the proxy is in
favor of management. Let 1 1 b denote the probability of this event.
30. In the working paper Dasgupta and Nanda (1995), we provide an example in
which for b small, firm value is decreasing in b.
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not repeat the analysis here. We next discuss policy issues related to
voting bias and fiduciary responsibility.
7. Multiple Equilibria, Management Bias,
and Fiduciary Responsibility
We have so far discussed equilibria A and B separately. It will be estab-
lished below that there exist parameter values for which both equilibria
are feasible. In this section we discuss the conditions under which one
of these equilibria may dominate in terms of firm value maximization,
when both can exist. We also discuss under what conditions one type
of equilibrium may be expected to prevail rather than the other. An
interesting issue that arises is whether, as a result of policy actions, a
particular equilibrium may be eliminated.
We begin by characterizing conditions under which multiple
equilibria can exist:
Proposition 10: So long as A1 and A2 hold, nondegenerate31 type A
equilibria exist for all parameter values for which nondegenerate type B equilib-
ria exist, but not vice versa.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
In equilibrium B the proxy process is used by uninformed L’s as
a way to tap into the information of passive institutional shareholders.
Intuitively one would therefore expect the benefits of the proxy process
to be increasing in the relative quality of the institutional shareholder’s
information. In terms of model parameters a higher p (quality of pas-
sive shareholder information) and 1 1 m (the fraction of uninformed
L’s) makes it more likely that the existence conditions for type B equilib-
rium are satisfied. When both equilibria can exist, we may also expect
higher values of these parameters to be associated with a larger firm
value under equilibrium B than under equilibrium A. This intuition is
formalized below:
Proposition 11(i): For any p . 12 for which the uninformed L’s partici-
pation constraint holds holds, define m* to be the critical value of m such that
condition (2) is satisfied for m , m*. Then:
(a) There exists a value m(p, b) of m, where m(p, b) # m*, such that type B
equilibrium exists and dominates type A equilibrium iff m , m(p, b).
31. By nondegenerate, we mean equilibria in which both tender offers and proxy
challenges are used with positive probability.
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(b) m(p, b) N 1 as p N 1.
Proof. See the Appendix. M
Part (a) indicates that, given any p . 12, firm value is higher under
type B equilibrium if the proportion of informed L’s is sufficiently small.
To understand why, we need to remind ourselves that in type B equilib-
rium, in contrast to type A, the uninformed L also initiates a proxy,
and this is beneficial for firm value so long as p . 12. Part (b) of the
proposition is intuitive: it indicates that type B will dominate if p is
large enough.
The relative frequency with which tender offers and proxy con-
tests are selected depends on the particular equilibrium that prevails.
When both equilibria can exist, the occurrence of tender offers and
proxy contests can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 11(ii): For any set of parameter values for which both
types of equilibria exist, tender offers are more frequent in type B equilibria
than in type A. There exists a value of m, say mp, such that proxy contests
are less frequent in type B equilibrium than in type A for m $ mp, but more
frequent for m , mp, provided that a type B equilibrium is viable at the particu-
lar value of m being considered.32
Proof. See the Appendix. M
That tender offers are used more frequently in an equilibrium in
which the proxy process is more meaningful may appear counterintui-
tive. The reason is that, in a type B equilibrium, the perfectly informed
large shareholder is defeated with some probability, and this encour-
ages the use of tender offers. On the other hand, in a type B equilibrium,
the participation of uninformed L’s in the proxy is encouraged. If the
proportion of uninformed L’s is high, the frequency of proxies will be
also higher in a type B equilibrium.
It may be interesting to speculate on whether or not there are
particular firm characteristics that make one or the other equilibrium
more likely to prevail. Notice that only type A equilibria are possible
if either conditions (2) or (6) do not hold. This situation arises if (i) p
is low (possibly related to low and/or dispersed levels of institutional
investor ownership in the firm), (ii) the potential for bias is high, due
to the larger presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors such
as banks or insurance companies (Brickley et al., 1988), (iii) m is high
32. Recall that for m too large, condition (2) will not hold and type B will not be
viable.
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(the dissident is a former insider, or has established reputation for suc-
cessful takeovers), (iv) the dissident’s stake a is low, and (v) the poten-
tial value improvement (i.e., E [z | z . 0]) is low in relation to proxy
costs cP—which might be true of smaller firms. Since, by Proposition
10, type A equilibria are possible whenever type B equilibria are, it is
difficult to be specific as to when the latter will prevail. However, one
particular factor that may favor the existence of type B equilibria is
significant institutional ownership. In part this is because institutional
investors may be expected to be better informed when their ownership
stake is higher. Also, the expected liability of the institutional investors
from potential lawsuits for breach of fiduciary responsibility may in-
crease with their ownership stake in the firm, causing them to pursue
a policy of informed voting. Knowing this, a dissident large shareholder
may be motivated to initiate a proxy contest even when not highly
informed.
The discussion above has identified conditions under which firm
value is larger if one equilibrium rather than the other prevails, when
both are possible. We now consider the possibility that as a consequence
of policy actions by regulatory authorities or by changes to the firm’s
corporate charter, a particular equilibrium may be eliminated.
7.1 ERISA and Fiduciary Responsibility
The US Department of Labor (DOL) in recent years has repeatedly
made fiduciaries of employment benefit plans under ERISA aware of
their obligations concerning proxy voting. A possible consequence of
such rules may be that institutions, in an effort to justify their voting
practices, will vote proxies on the basis of their own information. How-
ever, as we argue below, this may not be desirable if the quality of the
information with institutional investors is relatively poor. Even in the
presence of significant management bias, the DOL policy could be
harmful.
We show this by way of an example. Suppose that (6) does not
hold: this means that even when the institutional investor is forced to
vote on the basis of his own information and bias is eliminated (b 4
1), the uninformed L does not participate. Under such circumstances,
the firm value is given by
V DOL 4 q ` mr 1p E
zBm
zBl
z dF ` Ez
zBm
z dF2 .
Notice now that since the uninformed L cannot participate when b 4
1 [(6) does not hold], he cannot participate when there is bias. Thus,
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only type A equilibrium would prevail before the change in policy.
The firm value before the policy change is given by
V A(b ) 4 q ` mr 1b E
zAm(b)
zAl (b)
z dF ` Ez
zAm(b)
z dF2
Now suppose b 4 p. Then it is readily checked that zAl (b ) 4 zBl (b 4
1) and zAm(b ) 4 zBm(b 4 1), and V A(b ) 4 VDOL.33 For all b . p, therefore,
V A(b ) . VDOL. In other words, if the efficiency of the proxy process
(measured by the quality of information possessed by the institutional
investors) is not sufficiently high, forcing institutional investors to vote
on the basis of their information (and eliminating bias) may not im-
prove upon a process in which there is some bias. In this regard, policies
that tend to improve the quality of institutional shareholder informa-
tion—for example, the recent decision by the SEC to relax its restric-
tions on shareholder communications (and solicitations)—could prove
beneficial.
We summarize the above discussion in the following:
Proposition 12: Irrespective of whether or not management bias is
present, a policy that obliges the institutional investors to vote on the basis
of their information may decrease firm value.
7.2 Institutional Ownership and Proxy Contests
Pound (1988) finds that firms with greater institutional ownership are
less likely to experience proxy contests for control,34 and such chal-
lenges, when they do take place, are less likely to succeed. He attributes
these findings to promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutions.
Note, however, that these findings are also consistent with the discus-
sion above to the effect that a type B equilibrium is more likely when
institutional investors own larger stakes in a firm, since they have the
incentive to be better informed and to pursue a policy of informed
voting.35 Compared to a type A equilibrium, this would lead to lower
33. What this means is that type A equilibrium with bias 1 1 b is equivalent to type
B equilibrium with p 4 b in which the uninformed L does not participate—in both
cases, proxy challenges are successful with probability b. For expressions for zAm(b ) and
zAl (b ), see the proof of Proposition 9.
34. As opposed to other types of proxy contests, such as antitakeover amendments.
The idea here is that institutions tend to be more conservative and favor management
when major policy changes are at issue.
35. An alternative argument would appeal to the notion of a ‘‘focal point’’ facilitating
coordination among strategic players: the high level of institutional ownership allows
coordination to a better equilibrium.
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success rate in proxy challenges for such firms (since the challenges
are defeated some of the time in a type B equilibrium). By virtue of
Proposition 11(ii), one would also observe a greater use of tender offers
for control contests. Since tender offers and proxy contests are substi-
tute mechanisms for control contests but not for other types of proxy
initiatives, one would see lower use of proxy contests for control as a
proportion of all proxy initiatives. These are exactly the same findings
as in Pound (1988), but obviously, the implications for firm value are
quite different. Pound associates these findings with management bias
and lower firm value, whereas, under the alternative interpretation
suggested here, the firm value may well be higher [see Proposition
11(i), part (b)].
8. Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed tender offers and proxy contests as alternative
means of exercising corporate control. We have argued that though
proxy contests may be more costly to organize than tender offers, they
may allow a dissident to draw upon the information of other sharehold-
ers when his own information is poor. When the dissident is confident
about the need to change corporate policy, he may be less willing to
risk losing a proxy contest and may choose to make a tender offer
instead. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical
evidence on the announcement effects of proxy contests and tender
offers on firm stock price. The model is extended to allow for proman-
agement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors, and the results
shown to be robust to the existence of such bias.
A broad message of the paper is that certain policy recommenda-
tions as well as interpretations of empirical regularities in the literature
appear dubious—once we explicitly recognize the substitutability be-
tween proxy contests and tender offers and consider the information
of both dissidents and other shareholders. An instance is the indirect
evidence of promanagement bias in voting by institutional investors
that, we have argued, is consistent with unbiased voting on the part
of institutions. Also, the fact that proxies are sometimes defeated, ac-
companied with a drop in firm stock price, is quite consistent with the
absence of voting bias. Therefore, policies directed to counter such bias
may be premature, in the absence of direct voting-level evidence. In
any case, we have argued that even in the presence of voting bias, it
is not obvious that requiring institutions to vote on the basis of their
information is necessarily a good idea. Nor is it obvious that it is socially
desirable to lower the costs of conducting proxies, given the substitut-
ability between proxy contests and tender offers.
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There is scant empirical evidence on the nature of the substitut-
ability between proxy contests and tender offers aside from Pound
(1991, 1992), who identifies changes in the costs of conducting proxy
contests that may have diminished their popularity relative to tender
offers. We believe that our model provides a systematic framework in
which to examine the historical evidence on the effect of changes in
regulatory and other costs on the frequency and success rates of proxy
contests and tender offers, changes in the announcement effects on
stock prices, and the characteristics of dissidents and other sharehold-
ers. The model may also provide a useful framework in which to exam-
ine cross-sectional and cross-country differences in the manner in
which control contests are initiated and resolved. Our hope is that this
paper may play a role in stimulating such work in the future.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (a): If the uninformed L does not participate
in the proxy, then the announcement of a proxy is possible only if z .
0, since the expected gain from a proxy to an informed L is az Pr[L
wins proxy] 1 cP , which is nonnegative only if z . 0. Consequently,
irrespective of his own information, N must support L.
(b): Suppose N observes t1. We shall compute the expected im-
provement in firm value from supporting L (N’s gain is proportional
to this). N’s information set consists of t 4 t1 and the fact that a proxy
has been announced. Let H denote the latter event. Then H [ $h1 , h2 },
where h1 is the event that an uninformed L makes the proxy challenge,
and h2 is the event that an informed L makes it.
The expected improvement in firm value is
E[z | t1, H ] 4 Pr[h1 | t1 ] E[z | t1, h1 ]
` Pr[h2 | t1 ] E[z | t1, h2 ]. (9)
It can be readily checked (using the fact that the unconditional probabil-
ity of observing t1 is 12) that Pr[h1 | t1 ] 4
1
2(1 1 m)/D and Pr[h2 | t1 ]
4 (1 1 p)m Pr[z [ ZP ]/D, where D 4
1
2(1 1 m) ` (1 1 p)m Pr[z [
ZP ].
Let g(z | t1 ) denote the conditional density of z, given that t1 is
observed. We have
g(z | t1 ) 4
Pr[ t1 | z ] ƒ(z )
ez.0 Pr[ t
1 | z] ƒ(z) dz ` ez,0 Pr[ t
1 | z] ƒ(z) dz
4
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where the last step follows from the assumption that F(z) is symmetric
around zero. This implies that g(z | t1 ) 4 (1 1 p)ƒ(z)/12 if z . 0, and
g(z | t1 ) 4 pƒ(z)/12 if z , 0. Thus, E[z | t1, h1 ] 4 [(1 1 p) ez.0 zƒ(z)
dz ` p ez,0 zƒ(z) dz ]/
1
2, which reduces to E[z | t1, h1 ] 4 1(2p 1 1)
E[z | z . 0], again using the assumption that the distribution is sym-
metric. Thus, the first term in the r.h.s. of (9) is 1 12(1 1 m)(2p 1 1)
E[z | z . 0]/D.
Next, note that E[z | t1, h2 ] 4 E[z | z [ ZP ], so that the second
term in the r.h.s. of (9) is m(1 1 p) Pr[z [ ZP ] E[z | z [ ZP ]/D. Combin-
ing these terms and substituting into (9), we get the l.h.s. of expression
(2) (divided by D, which is positive). Thus, if this is negative, N will
oppose the alternative being introduced, and if it is positive, he will
support it, given that his information is t 2. It can be shown exactly
similarly that if his information is t +, the expected gain in firm value
from the alternative is positive, so that he will support L. M
Proof of Proposition 3. We first restrict L to a bid of b*(a) and show
that the proposed strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Note that in the proposed equilibrium, the conditions of Proposi-
tion 2 and Corollary 1 are satisfied, so the bid b*(a) will succeed with
probability 1. Note also that from Proposition 1 it follows that in this
equilibrium, since the uninformed L stays out, N will vote with L, so
the proxy succeeds with probability 1. Thus, we have to show that the
strategies of the informed and uninformed L are as claimed. The payoff
to an informed L from a tender offer at an offer price of b*(a) is
PT(z, a) 4 0.5(z ` q) 1 (0.5 1 a)b*(a) 1 aq 1 cT
and that from the proxy is
PP(z, a) 4 az 1 cP .
We already know from the definition of zAm that an L that draws zAm is
indifferent between these two payoffs in the proposed equilibrium. The
derivative of PT(z, a) with respect to z is 0.5, while that of PP(z, a) is
a , 0.5. Hence, all types with z $ zAm will prefer a tender offer, while
those with z , zAm will prefer a proxy contest. Obviously, types with z
, zAl will stay out, as the expected gain from a proxy contest is negative
for them.
Consider now the uninformed L. Since E[z] 4 0, the expected
gain from a proxy contest is evidently negative in view of the proxy
costs. The expected gain from the tender offer is also negative, since
cT . 0 and b*(a) . 0. Thus, the uninformed L will stay out.
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Consider now bids other than b*(a). For such out-of-equilibrium
moves, we have to specify appropriate beliefs. Assume that if any other
bid is observed, z is believed to be a random draw from the set K of
types whose payoffs are higher, if this bid is accepted, than the equilib-
rium payoff. If the set K is empty, beliefs do not matter. Thus, these beliefs
are credible in the sense of Grossman and Perry. Clearly, no type can
benefit from bidding greater than b*(a) even if the bid is accepted. Hence,
consider b , b*(a). If we restrict attention to positive bids, we know that
the uninformed L will never bid. Let the bid be denoted q ` d, where d
, E[z̃ | z̃ $ zAm ]. The informed L’s who would deviate if the bid were ac-
cepted are all those who prefer the tender offer to the proxy contest at
the new bid, since the payoff from the proxy contest is not affected. Thus,
the lowest such z, say z′, is given by the following:
0.5(z′ ` q) 1 (0.5 1 a)(q ` d ) 1 aq 1 cT 4 az′ 1 cP , (10)
which gives
d 1 z′ 4
cP 1 cT
0.5 1 a . (11)
Since d , E[z̃ | z̃ $ zAm ], it follows from the expression for zAm [equation
(4)] that z′ , zAm . Hence, from Lemma 1, we have
E[z̃ | z̃ $ z′ ] 1 z′ . E[ z̃ | z̃ $ zAm ] 1 zAm 4
cP 1 cT
0.5 1 a 4 d 1 z′.
Hence, E[z̃ | z̃ $ z′ ] . d. However, if this condition holds, from Proposi-
tion 2, shareholders will not tender, and the bid will fail for sure. Conse-
quently, no bids below b*(a) can occur.
It remains to show that no other semipooling equilibrium exists
in which N votes with L and that is supported by consistent beliefs. By
arguments essentially similar to those made above, it can be shown
that it is not optimal for investors to accept bids below b*(a). Hence,
consider only b . b*(a) as alternative candidate equilibrium bidding
strategies. However, for each such b, the set K of types who benefit
from a bid of b*(a) if it is accepted is evidently the set [z̃, zAm ], and we
know then that such a bid will be accepted if z is believed to be a
random draw from this set. This upsets the equilibrium. M
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider type A equilibrium first.
The market value of the firm in type A equilibrium is given by
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The market value given that a tender offer is announced is
VAT 4 q ` E[z | z $ zAm ], (13)
and that following the announcement of a proxy contest is
V AP 4 q ` E[z | z [ [zAl , zAm ]]. (14)
It is immediately clear that V AT 1 V A . V AP 1 V A. From equation (12),
note also that V AT 1 V A . 0, and
V AP 1 V A 4 1 1Pr[z [ [zAl , zAm ]] 1 rm2 E
zAm
zAl
z dF 1 rm Ez
zAm
z dF.
For r sufficiently small, this is positive.
Next, consider type B equilibrium. The market value of the firm
in type B equilibrium is given by






z dF(z) ` mr Ez
zBm
z dF(z),
where the second term is the value improvement due to the participa-
tion of the uninformed L in the proxy contest and is derived from
considerations similar to those in equation (6). The last two terms de-
note the value improvement associated with an informed L from the
proxy contest and tender offer, respectively.
The value of the firm conditional on the tender-offer announce-
ment is
V BT 4 q ` E[z | z $ zBm ],
while that following the announcement of a proxy contest is
V BP 4 q `
1
2(1 1 m)(2p 1 1)E[z | z 1 0] ` mpE[z | z [ [z Bl , z Bm ]].
(16)
Evidently, a sufficient condition for V BT 1 V B . V BP 1 V B is that
max$E[z | z [ [zBl , z Bm ]], E[z | z . 0]} , E[z | z $ zBm ],
which is clearly satisfied. It can be shown as before that the former is
always positive, and the latter is positive for r sufficiently small. M
Proof of Proposition 6. The sign of the following partial derivatives
can be readily derived from equations (5) and (4) and Lemma 1 (see
Fig. 1):

















∂a , 0. (18)
1(i): The probability of a tender offer is rm[1 1 F(zAm )], and is thus
negatively related to zAm . The results are therefore immediate from equa-
tions (18) and (17).
1(ii): We have, letting y denote either cP , cT , or a,











The results follow immediately from equations (18) and (17).
2(i): The probability of a proxy challenge is rm[F(zAm ) 1 F(zAl )].
The results then follow immediately from equations (18) and (17).
2(ii): We have, letting y denote either cP , cT , or a,
∂(V AP 1 V A )
∂y 4 1
ƒ(zAm )
F(zAm ) 1 F(zAl )





F(zAm ) 1 F(zAl )
(E[z | z [ [zAl , zAm ]] 1 zAl )
∂zAl
∂y
` rmzAl ƒ(zAl )
∂zAl
∂y .
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is immediate from the expression
for firm value in (12) and from equations (18) and (17). M
Proof of Proposition 8. The market value of the firm in type B equilib-
rium is given in equation (15). The success probability of a proxy in
type B equilibrium is given by
x (m, p) 4
m Pr[z [ [zBl , zBm ]]








since the proxy succeeds with probability p when it is initiated by
an informed shareholder (z . 0), whereas when it is initiated by an
uninformed shareholder, its success probability is 12.
The comparative static results utilize signs of partial derivatives
∂zBm /∂y and ∂zBl /∂y, where y is cP , cT , or a. The signs of these partial
derivatives are the same as the corresponding ones for type A equilib-
Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism 817
rium given in equations (17) and (18). In addition, we have ∂zBm /∂p .
0 and ∂zBl /∂p , 0.
The results now follow from standard comparative static analysis.
We prove part 1 as an illustration: We have
∂V B
∂cP
4 1mr(1 1 p)zBm ƒ(zBm )
∂zBm
∂cP




The first term is positive, but the second is negative; hence the effect
is ambiguous in general. However, for p close to one, the second term
will dominate. The claim about the success probability can be easily
verified. M
Proof of Proposition 9. Notice the following for b # 1: The probability
that a proxy will be initiated in a type A equilibrium is r[F(zAm(b )) 1
F(zAl (b ))], where zAm(b ) represents the z at which L is indifferent be-
tween a proxy contest and a tender offer and is given by
0.5 1 a
0.5 1 ab E[z̃ | z̃ $ z
A
m(b )] 1 zAm(b ) 4
cP 1 cT
0.5 1 ab ,
and zAl (b ) is the lowest z at which L participates in a proxy contest and
is given by




Moreover, the firm value in type A equilibrium is given by
V A(b ) 4 q ` mr1b E
zAm(b)
zAl (b)
z dF ` Ez
zAm(b)
z dF2. (20)
That a lower b leads to less success for proxy challenges in type A
equilibrium is obvious. It is also immediate from the expressions for
zAm(b ) and zAl (b ) that the former is increasing and the latter is decreasing
in b, so that the probability of a proxy contest, given by r[F(zAm(b )) 1
F(zAl (b ))], is decreasing in 1 1 b, the degree of management bias. Differ-
entiating the expression for V A(b ) w.r.t. b, we get
∂V A
∂b 4 rm 1E
zAm(b)
zAl (b)
z dF 1 (1 1 b )zAm(b )ƒ(zAm(b ))
∂zAm(b )
∂b
1 bzAl (b )ƒ(zAl (b ))
∂zAl (b )
∂b 2.
Notice that ∂zAm(b )/∂b . 0 and ∂zAl (b )/∂b , 0, so that in general
the sign of this derivative is ambiguous. However, for b sufficiently
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close to one, the middle term becomes small and the derivative is posi-
tive. M
Proof of Proposition 10. To prove this result, the following lemma is
useful:
Lemma 2: For p , 1,
(i) zBl (b ) . zAl (b ), and
(ii) zBm(b ) , zAm(b ).
Proof. Note that the cutoff z at which L is indifferent between a tender
offer and a proxy contest is now given by
0.5 1 a
0.5 1 abp E[z̃ | z̃ $ z
B
m(b )] 1 zBm(b ) 4
cP 1 cT
0.5 1 abp ,
and the lowest z for which a proxy challenge is viable is given by




Thus, (i) is immediate. To see (ii), note that zBm(b ) 4 zAm(b ) for p 4 1,
and zBm(b ) is increasing in p. M
Notice now that so long as A2 holds, tender offers will be used
with positive probability in both equilibria. The proposition then fol-
lows from the fact that by virtue of Lemma 2, assumption A4 implies
A3, so that a nondegenerate type A equilibrium exists whenever a non-
degenerate type B exists. However, for type B to exist, even when A1,
A2, and A4 hold, two additional conditions—equation (2) and the par-
ticipation constraint for the uninformed L—need to be satisfied. For
example, for m 4 1, condition (2) will not hold; yet, type A equilibrium
will exist, since its existence is independent of m. M
Proof of Proposition 11(i). The Firm value in type B equilibrium for
b # 1 is





z dF(z) ` mr Ez
zBm
z dF(z).
We can rearrange this expression as










z dF ` rm Ez
zBm(b)
z dF
Thus, comparing with the expression for the market value of the firm
in type A equilibrium given in equation (20), we have
V B(b ) x V A(b )
as













Notice that the expression in large parentheses on the l.h.s. of (21) is
the same as the negative of the l.h.s. of (2). Call it D. Thus, type B
equilibrium exists iff D is positive.
Notice now from Lemma 2 that both terms in the r.h.s. of (21) are
positive: hence, the r.h.s. in general is of ambiguous sign.
Consider first the case in which the r.h.s. is positive (this happens
for b sufficiently close to 1). Then the r.h.s. of (21) is increasing in m.
Also, the l.h.s. is decreasing in m. Moreover, at m 4 0, for p . 12, the
l.h.s. is positive and clearly exceeds the r.h.s., which is zero. Hence,
part (a) of the proposition follows.
Next, suppose the r.h.s. of (21) is negative. Since D . 0 whenever
type B equilibrium exists, type B dominates for m # m*.
Part (b) follows from the fact that at p 4 1, the l.h.s. is positive
but the r.h.s. is zero, as zAl (b ) 4 zBl (b ) and zBm(b ) 4 zAm(b ). M
Proof of Proposition 11(ii). That tender offers are more frequent in
type B equilibrium follows immediately from Lemma 2. From the same
lemma, proxy contests would be less frequent at m 4 1 at type B equilib-
rium than at type A if type B equilibrium were viable; however, at m
4 1 condition (2) does not hold. By continuity, there exists mP such
that proxy contests would be less frequent iff m $ mP. The rest is
immediate. M
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